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FREE WILL AND NEUROSCIENCE 
Alfred R. Mele 
Florida State University 
 
 
Do we have free will?  If you were to Google the question, you 
might turn up such claims as the following: 
The debate about free will . . . has been given new 
life by scientists, especially neuroscientists studying 
how the brain works. And what they’re finding 
supports the idea that free will is a complete 
illusion. (Jerry Coyne, “Why You Don’t Really 
Have Free Will,” USATODAY.com, Jan. 1, 2012) 
 
“Free will” is not the defining feature of 
humanness, modern neuroscience implies, but is 
rather an illusion that endures only because 
biochemical complexity conceals the mechanisms 
of decision making. (Tom Siegfried, “The 
Decider,” Science News magazine, Dec. 6, 2008) 
 
Researchers have found patterns of brain activity 
that predict people’s decisions up to 10 seconds 
before they’re aware they’ve made a choice. . . . The 
result was hard for some to stomach because it 
suggested that the unconscious brain calls the 
shots, making free will an illusory afterthought. 
(Elsa Youngsteadt, “Case Closed for Free Will,” 
Science NOW Daily News, April 14, 2008) 
 
The concept of free will is a non-starter, both 
philosophically and scientifically [because] no 
description of mental and physical causation . . . 
allows for this freedom that we habitually claim for 
ourselves and ascribe to others. (Sam Harris, 
“Morality without ‘Free Will’,” Huffington Post, May 
30, 2011) 
In Mele 2009, I argued that the scientific experiments that are most 
often claimed to prove that free will is an illusion actually leave the 
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existence of free will wide open.  In the present article I focus on 
an important dimension of the issue that deserves more attention 
than it received in Mele 2009. 
Overt actions are actions that essentially involve peripheral 
bodily motion.  Examples include signing a petition against the 
death penalty, proposing marriage, flexing a wrist, and pressing a 
button.  My topic here is a scientific argument for the thesis that 
no overt actions are free actions (or exercises of free will) that may 
be sketched as follows: 
 
Skeptical Argument 
1. The overt actions studied in experiments of the kind to be 
described do not have corresponding consciously made 
decisions or conscious intentions among their causes. 
(empirical premise) 
2. So probably no overt actions have corresponding consciously 
made decisions or conscious intentions among their causes. 
(inference from 1) 
3. An overt action is a free action only if it has a corresponding 
consciously made decision or conscious intention among its 
causes. (theoretical premise) 
4. So probably no overt actions are free actions. (conclusion) 
In Mele 2009, I argued that the data I discussed there do not justify 
the first premise.  In the present article I focus on the inference 
made in the second premise.  In section 1, I briefly describe the 
experiments at issue in premise 1.  The remainder of the article is a 
critique of premise 2.  I do not discuss premise 3. 
1. Some Experiments 
In the studies described in this section, participants are asked to 
report on when they had certain conscious experiences – variously 
described as experiences of an urge, intention, or decision to do 
what they did.  After they act, they make their reports. 
In some of Benjamin Libet’s studies (1985, 2004), participants 
are asked to flex their right wrists whenever they wish.  When 
participants are regularly reminded not to plan their wrist flexes and 
when they do not afterward say that they did some such planning, 
an average ramping up of EEG activity (550 ms before muscle 
motion begins) precedes the average reported time of the 
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conscious experience (200 ms before muscle motion begins) by 
about a third of a second (1985).  Libet claims that decisions about 
when to flex were made at the earlier of these two times (1985, p. 
536).  I have disputed that claim elsewhere (Mele 2009, ch. 3); but, 
for the sake of argument, I am supposing here that it is true. 
Chun Siong Soon, Marcel Brass, Hans-Jochen Heinze, and 
John-Dylan Haynes, commenting on Libet’s studies, write: 
“Because brain activity in the SMA consistently preceded the 
conscious decision, it has been argued that the brain had already 
unconsciously made a decision to move even before the subject 
became aware of it” (2008, p. 543).  To get additional evidence 
about the proposition at issue, they use functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) in a study of participants instructed to 
do the following “when they felt the urge to do so”: “decide 
between one of two buttons, operated by the left and right index 
fingers, and press it immediately” (p. 543).  Soon and colleagues 
find that, using readings from two brain regions (one in the 
frontopolar cortex and the other in the parietal cortex), they are 
able to predict with about 60% accuracy (see Soon et al. 2008, 
supplementary figure 6, Haynes 2011, p. 93) which button 
participants will press several seconds in advance of the button 
press (p. 544). 
In another study, Soon et al. instruct participants to “decide 
between left and right responses at an externally determined point 
in time” (2008, p. 544).  The subjects are to make their decision 
about which of two buttons to press when shown a cue and then 
execute their decision later, when presented with a “respond” cue 
(see their supplementary material on “Control fMRI experiment”).  
They report that one interpretation of their findings in this study is 
that “frontopolar cortex was the first cortical stage at which the 
actual decision was made, whereas precuneus was involved in 
storage of the decision until it reached awareness” (p. 545). 
In Mele n.d.a, I argue that Soon and colleagues are more likely 
to have detected a slight unconscious bias toward pressing a 
particular button on the next go than an actual decision (or 
intention) to press that button.  But I suppose here, for the sake of 
argument, that, as they claim, they detect decisions several seconds 
in advance of button presses. 
Itzhak Fried, Roy Mukamel, and Gabriel Kreiman record 
directly from the brain, using depth electrodes (2011).  They report 
that “A population of SMA [supplementary motor area] neurons is 
sufficient to predict in single trials the impending decision to move 
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with accuracy greater than 80% already 700 ms prior to subjects’ 
awareness” (p. 548) of their “urge” (p. 558) to press the key.   By 
“700 ms prior to subjects’s awareness” here, Fried and coauthors 
mean 700 ms prior to the awareness time that participants later 
report: the authors recognize that the reports might not be accurate 
(pp. 552-53, 560).  And, unlike Libet, they seem sometimes to treat 
decisions to press keys as items that are, by definition, conscious 
(p. 548).  Possibly, in their thinking about their findings, they 
identify the participants’ decisions with conscious urges.  If that is 
how they use “decision,” their claim here is that on the basis of 
activity in the SMA they can predict with greater than 80% accuracy 
what time a participant will report to be the time at which he was 
first aware of an urge to press 700 ms prior to the reported time.  
But someone who uses the word “decision” differently may 
describe the same result as a greater than 80% accuracy rate in 
detecting decisions 700 ms before the person becomes aware of a 
decision he already made.  These two different ways of describing 
the result obviously are very different.  The former description 
does not include an assertion about when the decision was made. 
2. Are All Decisions on a Par? 
For reasons I have presented elsewhere (see Mele 2009 on Libet’s 
work and Mele n.d.a on Soon et al. 2008), I am not persuaded that 
participants in the studies described above actually decide on the 
actions described there before they become conscious of their 
decisions or intentions.  But, for the sake of argument, I suppose 
that they do unconsciously decide to perform simple actions they 
perform.  I suppose as well that premise 1 of the skeptical argument 
sketched above is true, and I focus on the inference made in 
premise 2. 
Assume that participants in the studies at issue actually made 
the decisions the experimenters attributed to them, decisions that 
were detected with scientific apparatus.  What did they decide to 
do?  They decided when to flex a wrist, when to press a key,1 or 
which of two buttons to press.  In none of these studies was there 
any reason to prefer the decided upon options to similar alternative 
options – and vice versa.  There was no reason to prefer a particular 
1.  Fried et al. mention another study of theirs in which participants 
select which hand to use for the key press (2011, p. 553). 
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moment for beginning to flex a wrist or press a key over nearby 
moments and (in the study by Soon et al.) no reason to prefer one 
button over the other.  Accordingly, conscious reasoning about 
what to do – for example, about whether to press the left button 
or the right button next or about exactly when to flex – is out of 
place. 
The philosophical literature on free will tends to link free will 
closely to moral responsibility.  “Moral responsibility” means 
different things to different philosophers.  But, according to one 
reasonable way of thinking about the matter, a necessary condition 
of an agent’s being morally responsible for an action is that the 
action has some moral import or significance.  The actions studied 
in the experiments described in section 1 have no such import: they 
are morally neutral actions.  Of course, one might flex a wrist to 
signal an accomplice to shoot someone or press a button to launch 
a nuclear missile.  But that is not what is happening in the 
experiments under consideration, and it is the participants’ wrist 
flexes and button presses – along with the decisions that 
supposedly issue in them – that are at issue now. 
It may be claimed that the participants in these studies did not 
freely make the decisions being studied and therefore would not 
have been morally responsible for those decisions – nor for the 
actions that execute them – even if those decisions and overt 
actions had been morally significant.  This claim merits attention.  
I have already observed that in these studies, there is never a reason 
to prefer the decided upon option to other relevant options and 
vice versa.  This normally is not the case when people are making 
moral decisions.  In typical cases of moral decision making, pros and 
cons are weighed.  It is difficult to generalize from (alleged) findings 
about morally neutral decisions made under conditions of 
indifference to the conclusion that all morally significant decisions 
made in situations in which agents apparently are consciously 
weighing competing reasons are made unconsciously.  Perhaps 
when agents consciously weigh reasons and apparently decide 
(partly) on the basis of their conscious assessment of reasons, the 
decisions they make are much less likely to be unconsciously made.  
Perhaps the conscious processing increases the likelihood of 
conscious deciding.2 
2.  For a model of conscious deciding, see Mele 2009, pp. 40-44. 
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A related point about generalizing from (alleged) findings in the 
experiments at issue to propositions about all decisions should also 
be made (see Mele 2009, pp. 79-87).  Philosophers who believe that 
we sometimes act freely (exercise free will) disagree about whether 
we can do this in situations that feature indifference between or 
among our leading options.  As some philosophers conceive of free 
will (Campbell 1957, pp. 167-74, Kane 1989, p. 252, van Inwagen 
1989), exercises of it can occur only in situations in which people 
make significant moral or practical decisions in the face of 
temptation or competing motivation; and some other philosophers 
are much less restrictive about free will (Fischer and Ravizza 1992, 
O’Connor 2000, pp. 101-7).  If the former group of philosophers 
is right, alleged findings of the sort I have mentioned do not tell us 
much about free will: the decisions and overt actions being 
investigated are outside the sphere of free will.  But even if a proper 
conception of free will leaves room for free decisions in cases of 
indifference, the disagreement between the two groups just 
mentioned may point to an interesting difference among kinds of 
allegedly free decisions.  Perhaps people who consciously struggle 
with temptation or competing motivation during a process that 
leads to a decision are more likely to decide consciously than are 
people who unreflectively select among options with respect to 
which they are indifferent.  If so, drawing the conclusion that all 
decisions are unconsciously made from the alleged findings about 
decisions in the experiments at issue is a huge stretch. 
One cannot reason persuasively from the alleged findings 
about decisions in cases in which, as the agents realize, they have 
no reason to favor any acceptable option over any other to the 
conclusion that the same sort of thing would be found in cases in 
which the agents are far from indifferent about their options.  
Elsewhere, I have suggested that automatic tie-breaking 
mechanisms are at work in many ordinary cases in which we are 
indifferent between or among the available options (Mele 2009, p. 
83); and it is rash to assume that what happens in situations 
featuring indifference is also what happens in situations in which 
unsettledness about what to do leads to careful, extensive, 
conscious reasoning about what to do.  Even if some action-ties 
are broken for us well before we are aware of what we “decided” 
to do, it certainly does not follow from this that we never 
consciously make decisions. 
For the reasons I have noted, one is not warranted in 
generalizing from alleged findings about the decisions allegedly 
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made in the experiments I have been discussing to the claim that 
all decisions are unconsciously made.  And the normal route from 
the claim that the decisions at issue are made unconsciously to the 
conclusion that no one has free will includes the presumption that 
just as these decisions are unconsciously made, so are all decisions. 
3. Short-term and Long-range Decisions and Intentions 
The decisions and intentions at issue in the studies discussed in 
section 1 concern actions to be performed right away or very soon.  
But some of our decisions and intentions concern actions to be 
performed days, weeks, or months later.  For example, I might 
decide on Monday to devote the workday on Friday to writing a 
referee report, and I might decide today, in March, to visit some 
friends abroad in July.  I have identified some problems involved 
in making the inference reported in premise 2.  Might another 
problem lie in differences between the short-term decisions and 
intentions that are supposedly being investigated in the studies 
described in section 1 and longer-term decisions and intentions?  I 
take up this question after commenting on some terminological 
matters and a theoretical issue. 
I have been using the word “decide,” but I have not discussed 
its meaning.  In my view, to decide to do something, A, is to 
perform a very brief action of a certain kind – an action of forming 
an intention to A (Mele 2003, ch. 9).  Deliberating about what to 
do often is not very brief, but it must be distinguished from an act 
of deciding that is based on deliberation.  Incidentally, my way of 
understanding deciding does not entail that all intentions are 
formed in acts of deciding.  In fact, many intentions seem to be 
acquired without being so formed (see Mele 2003, ch. 9).  If, as I 
believe, all decisions about what to do are prompted partly by 
uncertainty about what to do (Mele 2003, ch. 9), in situations in 
which there is no such uncertainty, no decisions will be made.  
Even so, intentions may be acquired in these situations. 
The expression “consciously made decision” appears in the 
skeptical argument sketched in my introduction.  A consciously 
made decision is just what it sounds like – a decision one is 
conscious of making when one makes it.  Elsewhere, I have argued 
that even if our consciousness of decision making were always to 
lag a bit behind decision making, that fact would not constitute a 
serious obstacle to free will (Mele n.d.b).  When we engage in 
protracted deliberation about weighty matters with a view to 
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deciding what to do, how unsettled do we typically feel very shortly 
before we have the conscious experience of settling the issue – that 
is, of deciding to A?  (Bear in mind that an experience in this sense 
of the word might not be veridical: you might have an experience 
of settling the issue now even if you unconsciously settled it 200 
ms ago.)  Perhaps, at this late point in a process culminating in a 
decision to A, we often feel strongly inclined to A, feel that we are 
on the verge of deciding to A, or something of the sort.  At these 
times, we may believe or feel that we are nearly settled on A-ing.  
If we are already settled on A-ing because, a few hundred 
milliseconds earlier, we settled the issue by unconsciously deciding 
to A, this belief or feeling is a bit off the mark.  But its being 
inaccurate is entirely compatible with our conscious reasoning’s 
having played an important role in producing our decision to A.  
And the role it played may be conducive to our having decided 
freely and to our freely performing the action we decided to 
perform (see Mele n.d.b). 
That, as I say, is a thesis I have defended elsewhere.  In the 
present section I focus on another point.  Return to premise 2 of 
the skeptical argument: 
2. So probably no overt actions have corresponding consciously 
made decisions or conscious intentions among their causes. 
This premise refers both to consciously made decisions and to 
conscious intentions.  The latter merit attention here.  Even if all 
decisions are made unconsciously, it certainly seems that we 
sometimes are conscious of our intentions.  Perhaps, it sometimes 
happens that we become conscious of an intention to A formed in 
an unconsciously made decision to A some time after that decision 
is made.  How strongly do data of the sort reviewed in section 1 
support the inference about conscious intentions reported in 
premise 2, even if it is assumed that premise 1 is true? 
The question I just raised is an approximation the question that 
will become the main topic of this section.  Some clarification is 
required before I begin to develop an answer.  The existence of 
effective conscious intentions seemingly does not depend on the 
truth of substance dualism – a doctrine that includes a commitment 
to the idea that “associated with each human person, there is a 
thinking thing . . . not composed of the same kinds of stuff as . . . 
nonmental things” (Zimmerman 2006, p. 115; Zimmerman 
describes the “thinking thing” as a soul, but some substance 
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dualists prefer to use the word “mind”).  Conscious intentions 
might, for example, be physical items or supervene on physical 
items.  Scientists normally are not metaphysicians; and they should 
not be expected to take a stand on metaphysical connections 
between mental items and physical items – for example, on 
whether conscious intentions supervene on physical states.3  From 
a physicalist neuroscientific point of view, evidence that the 
physical correlates of conscious intentions are among the causes of 
some corresponding actions may be counted as evidence that 
conscious intentions are among the causes of some corresponding 
actions, and evidence that the physical correlates of conscious 
intentions are never among the causes of corresponding actions 
may be counted as evidence that conscious intentions are never 
among the causes of corresponding actions.  In this connection, try 
to imagine a scientific discovery that the physical correlates of 
conscious intentions actually are (or actually are not) conscious 
intentions or that conscious intentions do (or do not) supervene 
on their physical correlates.  How would the discovery be made?  
What would the experimental design be?  As I observed in Mele 
2009 (p. 146), it is primarily philosophers who would worry about 
the metaphysical intricacies of the mind-body problem despite 
accepting the imagined proof about physical correlates, and the 
argumentation would be distinctly philosophical.4 
Consider an intention to A together with one’s consciousness 
of that intention.  Call that combination an intention+ to A.  Might 
it – and not just some part or aspect of it – be among the causes of 
an A-ing?  How strongly do data of the sort reviewed in section 1 
support the inference that intentions+ to A are (as wholes) never 
among the causes of A-ing, even if it is assumed that premise 1 is 
true?  This is my topic now.  I pay particular attention to intentions 
that are neither for the present nor for the near future.  I call them 
significantly distal intentions. 
There is a large and growing body of work on “implementation 
intentions” (for reviews, see Gollwitzer 1999 and Gollwitzer and 
Sheeran 2006).  Implementation intentions, as Peter Gollwitzer 
conceives of them, “are subordinate to goal intentions and specify 
3.  Kim 2003 is an excellent introduction to supervenience. 
4. Jackson 2000 is an excellent brief critical review of various 
relevant philosophical positions that highlights the metaphysical 
nature of the debate. 
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the when, where, and how of responses leading to goal attainment” 
(1999, p. 494).  They “serve the purpose of promoting the 
attainment of the goal specified in the goal intention.”  In forming 
an implementation intention, “the person commits himself or 
herself to respond to a certain situation in a certain manner.” 
In one study of participants “who had reported strong goal 
intentions to perform a BSE [breast self-examination] during the 
next month, 100% did so if they had been induced to form 
additional implementation intentions” (Gollwitzer 1999, p. 496, 
reporting on Orbell et al. 1997).  In a control group of people who 
also reported strong goal intentions to do this but were not induced 
to form implementation intentions, only 53% performed a BSE.  
Participants in the former group were asked to state in writing 
“where and when” they would perform a BSE during the next 
month.  These statements expressed implementation intentions. 
Another study featured the task of “vigorous exercise for 20 
minutes during the next week” (Gollwitzer 1999, p. 496).  “A 
motivational intervention that focused on increasing self-efficacy 
to exercise, the perceived severity of and vulnerability to coronary 
heart disease, and the expectation that exercise will reduce the risk 
of coronary heart disease raised compliance from 29% to only 
39%.”  When this intervention was paired with the instruction to 
form relevant implementation intentions, “the compliance rate 
rose to 91%.” 
In a third study reviewed in Gollwitzer 1999, drug addicts who 
showed symptoms of withdrawal were divided into two groups.  
“One group was asked in the morning to form the goal intention 
to write a short curriculum vitae before 5:00 p.m. and to add 
implementation intentions that specified when and where they 
would write it” (p. 496).  The other participants were asked “to 
form the same goal intention but with irrelevant implementation 
intentions (i.e., they were asked to specify when they would eat 
lunch and where they would sit).”  Once again, the results are 
striking: although none of the people in the second group 
completed the task, 80% of the people in the first group completed 
it. 
Numerous studies of this kind are reviewed in Gollwitzer 1999, 
and Gollwitzer and Paschal Sheeran report that “findings from 94 
independent tests showed that implementation intentions had a 
positive effect of medium-to-large magnitude . . . on goal 
attainment” (2006, p. 69).  Collectively, the results provide evidence 
that the presence of relevant significantly distal implementation 
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intentions markedly increases the probability that agents will 
execute associated distal “goal intentions” in a broad range of 
circumstances.  In the experimental studies that Gollwitzer reviews, 
participants are explicitly asked to form relevant implementation 
intentions, and the intentions at issue are consciously expressed 
(1999, p. 501).5 
In Mele 2009, I argued that findings of the kind just described 
provide evidence that what I am here calling intentions+ 
sometimes are (as wholes) among the causes of corresponding 
actions (pp. 136-44).  I will not repeat the arguments here.  The 
main point I want to make is that one who is considering making 
the inference expressed in premise 2 of the skeptical argument 
should attend to differences between intentions of the kind that are 
supposedly being studied in the experiments described in section 1 
– that is, proximal or nearly proximal intentions – and significantly 
distal intentions. 
Participants in the neuroscience experiments described in my 
first section were asked to make reports about consciousness – 
reports about when they were first conscious of an urge, intention, 
or decision.  Imagine a study that resembles the experiment by 
Libet that I described but without any instruction to report on 
conscious urges or the like.  At the beginning of the imagined 
experiment, participants are told to flex their right wrists 
spontaneously a few times each minute while watching a fast clock.  
Afterwards they are asked whether they were often conscious of 
intentions, urges, or decisions to flex.  A no answer would not be 
terribly surprising.  If you doubt that, try the following experiment 
on a friend who knows nothing about the studies at issue.  Ask 
your friend to flex his or her right wrist several times while having 
a conversation with you.  After a few minutes, ask your friend how 
often, when he or she flexed, he or she was aware of an intention 
to do that right then – a proximal intention.  In Libet’s studies, if 
participants are conscious of something like proximal intentions to 
flex, that consciousness may be largely an artefact of the instruction 
5.  It should not be assumed, incidentally, that all members of all 
of the control groups lack conscious implementation intentions.  
Perhaps some members of the control groups who executed their 
goal intentions consciously made relevant distal implementation 
decisions. 
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to report on such things – and unconscious intentions might have 
been just as effective in generating flexes. 
Is something similar likely to be true of conscious 
implementation intentions to do something days later?  I doubt it.  
As I observed elsewhere, consciousness of one’s significantly distal 
implementation intentions around the time they are formed or 
acquired promotes conscious memory, at appropriate times, of 
agents’ intentions to perform the pertinent actions at specific places 
and times, which increases the probability of appropriate 
intentional actions (Mele 2009, p. 143).  Two of the hypotheses 
tested in the BSE study I mentioned by Sheina Orbell and 
colleagues specifically concern memory: “Women who form 
implementation intentions will be less likely to report forgetting to 
perform the behavior”; and “Memory for timing and location of 
behavioral performance will mediate the effects of implementation 
intentions on behavior” (Orbell et al. 1997, p. 948).  Both 
hypotheses were confirmed by their data.  Indeed, a remarkable 
finding was that of the women who were highly motivated to 
perform a BSE, all of those in the implementation-intention group 
“reported performing the behavior at the time and place originally 
specified” (p. 952; see p. 950 for a single possible exception).  
Imagine that these fourteen women had had only unconscious 
implementation intentions – that they had never been conscious of 
their implementation intentions to conduct a BSE at a specific time 
and place.  That all fourteen women would succeed nonetheless in 
executing these significantly distal and relatively precise intentions 
– intentions specifying a place and time for a BSE – would be 
beyond amazing.  The consciousness aspect of intentions+ seems 
to be doing important work here – even if in some other situations 
that aspect of an intention+ may be useful for little more than 
enabling an experimental subject to comply with instructions to 
report on a conscious experience of a certain kind. 
4. Parting Remarks 
Consider decision making by one person after consultation with a 
group.  Imagine a person in his mid-seventies who has been 
diagnosed with terminal cancer.  He is contemplating suicide, and 
he has frank discussions with his wife and adult children about this.  
He outlines what he takes to be the advantages of suicide in his 
case, and he asks for his family’s reaction.  He is trying to gauge 
whether his loved ones would be more troubled by his suicide or 
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by the painful deterioration that is likely if he allows his disease take 
its course.  He sees what is best for him as intimately bound up 
with what is best for them.  After much discussion and reflection, 
he decides to take his life.  His intention is to wait – perhaps for a 
month or several months – until the quality of his life is such that, 
in his estimation, death would be preferable and then to execute 
his plan for suicide.  There are obvious differences between 
decision-making scenarios of this kind and the laboratory scenarios 
described in section 1.  Some of these differences should set off an 
internal warning signal in anyone contemplating the inference in 
premise 2 of the skeptical argument. 
I have argued that even if it is supposed that premise 1 of the 
skeptical argument is true, the inference expressed in premise 2 is 
unwarranted.  As I observed, in the experiments to which premise 
1 refers, there is no reason to prefer the decided upon options to 
similar alternative options (and vice versa), and no place for 
conscious reasoning about which option to select.  Furthermore, 
all the intentions and decisions that are supposedly investigated in 
these experiments are proximal or nearly proximal ones.  But in 
many ordinary cases of decision making, we are not indifferent 
about our options.  In some of those cases, we decide after 
engaging in careful conscious reasoning about pros and cons.  And 
in many cases of this kind, the decisions we make are significantly 
distal ones.  (The example in the preceding paragraph is a case in 
point.)  There are notable differences, then, between the relatively 
trivial decisions (allegedly) made in the laboratory settings that I 
have described and some other decisions we seem to make.  As I 
have explained, these differences constitute a significant obstacle 
to any attempt to generalize from the alleged finding that in the 
laboratory studies at issue consciously made decisions and 
conscious intentions are not among the causes of the wrist flexes 
and key or button presses to the conclusion (see premise 2 of the 
skeptical argument) that no overt actions have corresponding 
consciously made decisions or conscious intentions among their 
causes.  What is more, there is, as I have explained, evidence that 
significantly distal conscious intentions sometimes are among the 
causes of corresponding actions and that our consciousness of 
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those intentions plays a significant role in the production of 
corresponding actions.6 
 
6.  This article was made possible through the support of a grant 
from the John Templeton Foundation.  The opinions expressed in 
this article are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of 
the John Templeton Foundation.  This article draws on Mele 2012. 
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